Plato's Theaetetus - Sense, Soul and Being (Heidegger - Western Philosophy)

"An easily accessible reflection in the Theaetetus (185a ) shows how Plato develops the claim of Parmenides regarding νοεῖν [noein-to think] and εἶναι [einai-to be] as the problem of the relation of being to the soul, the ψυχή [psyche].  There Socrates explains to Theaetetus that  'you cannot grasp being, otherness, sameness, and equality by hearing or sight.  And yet you do say 'they are,' though you neither see nor hear them.  If you say 'salty,' you know which capacity, namely taste, you must depend on.  For being [spoken by Theaetetus], on the contrary, no bodily organs are to be found, but it seems to me that the soul of itself takes everything into view that we say about everything insofar as it is.'  [ἀλλ᾽αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν].  This passage shows that we do not attain the primary kind of being-determinations through the bodily organs, but the soul itself - purely of itself, according to its intrinsic freedom - relates to being."  -Heidegger p.143

- Theaetetus of Plato, L. Campbell, Oxford, 1883, notes p.161